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Abstract. Democratic regimes’ resorting to excessive force when fighting against terrorists is 
chrestomathically defined as “deviations” or “mistakes”. However, the frequency with which such 
“deviations” and “mistakes” take place and regular repetition of several scenarios give us the right 
to speak not so much about random dysfunctions as about standard political situations in whose 
framework, contrary to assertions of democracies’ immanent softness and moderation in 
administering violence even to their avowed enemies, democratic regimes with high probability can 
apply excessive force to their armed antagonists. This article wants to probe deeper into the 
question of the causes of such behaviour of democratic governments and to outline most probable 
sociopolitical scenarios of these governments’ falling into excess while combating terrorists. 
Introduction 
Researchers who study the problem of the violent response given to terrorist threat by 
democratic regimes [1,2,3,4,5] traditionally depart from three interrelated premises. 
Firstly, democratic regimes by definition are characterized by the supremacy of the law, the 
independence of the judicial system and the inviolability of human rights and civil liberties. 
Democracy gives to those dissatisfied with sociopolitical status quo legal means to express their 
dissatisfaction and try to peacefully bring about decisions aimed at redressing voiced grievances. 
Some researchers even argue that there exists a negative correlation between democracy and 
terrorism. In a nutshell, more democracy means less terror, to rephrase the title of one of numerous 
studies on the subject [6]. 
Secondly, peculiarities of their political and legal order make democracies more restrained, 
compared to dictatorships, in applying force even to avowed political enemies. 
Pointing at this, some authors argue that such “softness” could make democracies susceptible to 
terrorist violence [7]. Democratic regimes do not just deny the police or security forces a free hand; 
they are said to be too humane, treasuring every human life and therefore providing terrorists with 
plenty of easy targets. In other words, from this point of view, more democracy means more 
terrorism. (At least since early 1990s, this “cursed question” of whether democracy decreases or 
increases terrorism has been one of the main subjects of the discussion on the problem of 
democracy and terrorism. American researcher Leonard Weinberg, in his above cited book 
commenting on this debate’s interim results and prospects, draws rather pessimistic picture of 
possible debating the issue “back and forth until ennui or exhaustion sets in” [5].) 
Thirdly, even when facts of applying excessive force by democratic regimes are incontrovertible, 
it is presented as “mistakes” or “deviations” from that moderate line which democracies allegedly 
intrinsically follow regardless of anything. (By “the application of excessive force”, this author 
means the use of violence whose intensity unquestionably surpasses the level of the existing threat 
and which is aimed not at the neutralization of the enemy (where it is possible), but at the enemy’s 
destruction and the intimidation of those who are not directly involved into terrorist activity.) 
The question of the use of excessive force in countering terrorism is not limited to purely judicial 
or ethical issues (which alone would have warranted interest in this problem). Counterterrorism 
experience demonstrates that applying excessive force could not so much eradicate the threat as 
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lead to the escalation of a conflict. It could discredit a regime giving additional weight to terrorists’ 
accusations against authorities; or increase the number of a ruling regime’s opponents at the 
expense of those who suffered from authorities’ wanton violence or solidarized themselves with the 
victims of repressions; or finally, increase the cohesion of already existing anti-government 
organizations and elevate the level of their aggressiveness. 
The use of excessive force against terrorists by democratic governments is almost automatically 
defined as “deviations” or “mistakes”. However, the frequency with which such “deviations” and 
“mistakes” take place, their duration and scale and regular repetition of several scenarios provide 
ground for talking about standard political situations, not just random dysfunctions, in whose 
framework, contrary to assertions of democracies’ immanent softness and moderation in 
administering violence even to their avowed enemies, democratic regimes with high probability can 
apply excessive force to their armed antagonists. 
Democracy. Nothing more 
In the first place, it should be noted that the idea of the excessive force being alien to democratic 
regimes is based on the distorted understanding of democracy which emphasizes only one of 
democracy’s variations – a liberal one with its stably high legal standards and respect of human 
rights and civil liberties. 
However, the democratic character of the political regime manifests itself, sensu stricto, in a 
limited set of procedures through which particular organs of political authority are formed and 
empowered and certain political decisions are made. The notions of “the will of the majority”, 
“voting,” “people’s representation” are not put squarely into any clearly defined political or ethical 
coordinate system and merely refer to certain procedures that, however important they may be, do 
not define the whole complex of sociopolitical relations. To put it in another way, a democratic 
decision could be not only “technically” wrong, but also unjust. Fulfilment of the majority’s will 
could mean the utter neglect of interests of the minority. Finally, the very nature of the dominant 
majority could be unjustly artificial (due to various forms of gerrymandering, discrimination, etc.). 
In other words, the democraticality of a regime is basically a formal characteristic not 
necessarily implying the presence of a number of other significant sociopolitical features which, 
however, are virtually automatically attributed to democracy when liberal democracy is being 
presented as “democracy as such”. 
In his classic research devoted to the “waves” of democratization, Samuel Huntington notes: 
“Governments produced by elections may be inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, 
dominated by special interests, and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good. 
These qualities may make such governments undesirable but they do not make them undemocratic” 
[8] (italics added). 
In this light, one should speak of the gradation of democratic regimes which demonstrate 
different levels of stability of political institutions, legal system and respect for the rights of various 
minorities. The bottom threshold of this gradation form those regimes which Fareed Zakaria defines 
as “illiberal democracies” [9]. These illiberal democratic regimes possess minimal attributes of 
democracy (a multi-party system, holding of relatively free elections, an existence of at least 
marginally free mass media). At the same time, they are characterized by the unwarranted 
expansion of the executive branch’s authority at the expense of the legislative and judicial branches; 
by the rise of strong leaders who, after being elected, try to “fulfill the people’s will” circumventing 
legal “formalities”; by the aggressiveness of leading political parties to minorities which are pushed 
to the political periphery not only “in the name of the people”, but quite often with real and 
substantial popular support. 
In those cases when the problem of terrorism is dealt with by illiberal democratic regimes, 
authorities unhesitatingly and systematically cross the limit of sufficient force both with regard to 
terrorists and those who suspected of supporting them (Sri Lanka, 1980s-2000s; Peru, 1990s). It 
should be added that the application of excessive force to terrorists and their real (or alleged) 
sympathizers could be the sign of the accelerating degradation of illiberal democracy consequently 
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leading to its transformation into an openly authoritarian regime (Uruguay, 1973; Argentina, 
1976)
1
. However, the possibility of the latter scenario does not eliminate the specifics of the 
counterterrorism practice of illiberal democracies and this practice’s combination with purely 
democratic procedures. 
For example, in 1992, Peru’s President Alberto Fujimori staged an autogolpe (a self-coup), 
dissolved the Parliament and sharply expanded Presidential powers not in the last place justifying 
his actions by pointing at the necessity to respond to the terrorist threat [12,13]. But, contrary to the 
cases with Uruguay and Argentina where activities of political parties were strictly curtailed or 
prohibited and elections banned, the Peruvian illiberal democratic scenario was realized with the 
broad use of democratic mechanisms. It is worth noting that in the 1995 Presidential elections 
Fujimori’s actions (including the complex of harsh counterterrorism measures he had introduced) 
received genuine and substantial support from voters (the incumbent president was reelected by a 
majority of 64 % of voters collecting more votes than all other 13 candidates combined and thrice 
as many votes as his nearest competitor, former U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar) 
[14]. 
In their counterterrorism practice, illiberal democracies with easiness cross the threshold of 
sufficient force. However, the issue of democratic governments using excessive force against their 
armed opponents is not limited to illiberal democracy or, more broadly, – is not tantamount to the 
question of the relative perfection of the democratic political order. The remaining part of this 
article is devoted to the factors which are able – regardless of how fully a given regime incarnates 
the principles of democracy – to push a government towards actions leading to the use of excessive 
force or already constituting such use. 
Democracy vs. terrorism: scenarios and traps 
Firstly, the probability of a democratic government applying excessive force to its armed 
opponents increases proportionally to the scope of the conflict with which this government is 
dealing. In the first place, it can be observed in the choice of those who will be charged with 
terrorism counteraction. Facing a large-scale confrontation, a government could come to believe 
that the only effective way to solve the problem is to use against terrorists not the police (or 
analogous law enforcement agencies), but the regular military forces. Such decision could be 
understood by a government as serving the public interest. Nevertheless, the very nature of the 
military forces – the way in which they are trained, their tasks and methods – carries with itself the 
danger of the further escalation of a conflict. 
Contrary to the police and other law enforcement bodies which are focused at the neutralization 
and apprehension of criminals for them being next handed over to investigative and judicial 
authorities, the military forces as an instrument of war are by definition oriented at the destruction 
of an enemy or at least at the infliction upon an enemy of the maximum possible (physical or 
psychological) damage [15]. Even in the cases when the military forces are involved in 
counterterrorism activities only as one of the actors and are charged only with the most challenging 
tasks (for example, patrolling those areas which are too dangerous for lightly armed police officers), 
the very presence of the armed forces inevitably and tangibly raises the risk of the military units 
administering force that is excessive in the context of counterterrorism measures. It is especially so 
if and when the military conduct their duties in close contact with a civilian population (e.g. the 
events of “Bloody Sunday” in Londonderry, 30 January 19722). Applying excessive force may not 
                                                          
1
 One of the Argentinean army commanders notoriously commented on the junta’s intentions regarding the anti-
government armed underground: “We are going to kill 50,000 people; 25,000 subversives, 20,000 sympathizers, and we 
will make 5,000 mistakes” (quoted in: [10]). The final death toll of the Junta Militar which ruled Argentina in 1976-
1983 is lower than these “projected figures”, yet nevertheless it is chillingly high (between 10,000 and 30,000 people 
were killed during the so-called Guerra Sucia (the “Dirty War”) [11]). 
2
 “Bloody Sunday” refers to the incident that took place in Londonderry when British paratroopers while dispersing a 
peaceful demonstration opened fire on unarmed protesters killing 13 people on the spot (the 14
th
 victim died some 4 
months later) and injuring 14 more. 
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count among intentions of a government which decided to use the military against terrorists. 
Nevertheless, it does not mean that this government can consider itself free from any responsibility 
for potential (and highly probable) consequences of its decision. 
Secondly, the chances that a democratic government will use excessive force against its 
antagonists are higher if a conflict separates two distinctively specific social groups with a 
government being closely related to one of them, formed for the most part or exclusively of this 
group’s representatives and accountable primarily to this group (the protracted and bloody conflict 
between the Singhalese majority and the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, 1983-2009, can represent 
here the case in point) [16,17]
3. Under such conditions, political pressure from its “own” social 
group may goad a government towards using extremely harsh or excessive measures in order to 
protect interests its “own” constituency against terrorist threat from the “others”. 
The larger is the social, cultural and sometimes even spatial distance between opposing groups, 
the higher is the probability of excessive force being applied, which was (or is) regularly observed 
during the conflicts taking place in the territories occupied by democratic countries or representing 
the “relics” of those countries’ imperial past (for instance, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the war of 
independence in Algeria, 1950s-1960s). It also needs to be underlined that the escalation of 
governmental violence could represent not only a reaction to the threat from the “others”, but also – 
in case when a government comes under criticism from hawkish elements within its “own” 
constituency – could be intended to neutralize these elements’ influence and help a government 
survive the struggle against its political competitors. For example, one could turn to highly 
controversial measures (operation Demetrius) for mass internment of those suspected of being 
members or sympathizers of the Irish Republican Army which were undertaken by the government 
of Northern Ireland in 1971 not in the last place with the aim of neutralizing its vocal opponents 
from the radical Protestant Unionist circles [19]
4
. 
Thirdly, the probability of a democratic government applying excessive force to its violent 
antagonists also increases in cases when terrorist organizations fighting against this government 
succeed in dealing a major blow to the state. In such situations, a government’s restrain in applying 
force against terrorists may be perceived not only by the armed opposition, but also by this 
government’s own constituents as the sign of weakness and inability to protect national security. 
This public mood could, on the one hand, demand that a government act decisively, and, on the 
other hand, provide carte blanche for a government to conduct particularly harsh responsive actions 
avoiding possible limitations, paving the way to the imposition of dubious legal norms, etc. 
Moreover, in those flagrant cases when a crisis created by a resonant terrorist attack is 
aggravated by pogroms and outbursts of mob justice aimed against the social group in which 
interests terrorists pretend to act, a government could limit itself to ostentatious half-measures to 
restore order not wanting to risk its reputation in the eyes of enraged potential voters who took to 
streets (for example, anti-Sikh pogroms in India after the assassination of Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi by two her Sikh bodyguards in 1984
5
). 
 
                                                          
3
 Two main Sri Lankan (Singhalese) political parties – Freedom Party (FP) and United National Party (UNP) – for 
decades have engaged one another in what Neil De Votta called “ethnic outbidding” – in other words, the exploiting of 
nationalist sentiments of the large numbers of Singhalese voters [18]. Initially, UNP championed greater equality of the 
Singhalese majority and the Tamil minority. But after the decisive 1956 election victory which FP achieved from the 
nationalist, openly anti-Tamil positions (first of all, with regard to the issue of the Sinhala as the only official language), 
the UNP leadership recognized the inadequacy of its agenda to the expectations of Singhalese voters and revised its 
political course. 
4
 342 people were arrested on 9-10 August 1971. In total, 2,060 suspected Irish republicans were interned without trial 
between 1971 and 1975 [20] only few of them actually being involved into any illegal activity. It is a telling detail that 
first loyalists were interned no sooner than February 1973 [21]. 
5
 According to the report of Commission of Inquiry into the circumstances of the 1984 anti-Sikh riots, 2,800 people 
were killed throughout India in 4 days, from 31 October to 3 November 1984 (2,100 deaths in New Delhi alone) [22]. 
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Conclusion 
What is presented in this article should be viewed as a cautious preliminary outline of the 
problem which prepares the ground for further analysis. However, even at this early stage one can 
easily observe that the issues of the nature of democracy, democratic regimes combating terrorism 
and the controversial character of this combat require an unbiased approach free of idealizing 
democracy and the like distortions. 
Avoiding as much as possible the repetition of the already presented findings (on illiberal 
democracies’ easily turning to excessive force or risks awaiting all democratic regimes fighting 
terrorism), this author in conclusion wants to return only to one issue. As previously mentioned, 
since no later than early 1990s, the question of whether more democracy means more or less 
terrorism has been exercising researchers’ minds. In what sometimes looks like the recent edition of 
a scholastic debate, democracy is being presented as either a “soft target” for terrorist attacks or the 
“good genius” (to borrow the phrase from the Bush Administration’s 2006 National Security 
Strategy [23]) capable of alleviating social grievances, decreasing the level of political violence or 
even extinguishing political conflicts (and, consequently, terrorism) altogether. However, from the 
point of view presented in this article it is clear that democracy could also be neither “soft”, nor 
healing. It should be kept in mind in any further discussion of democracy and terrorism that nothing 
in the nature of democracy (if it is not viewed through the rose-coloured glasses) necessarily makes 
it timid, lenient or weak. Nothing automatically makes any formally democratic regime just, either. 
“Slipping of the edge” in the use of force against terrorists should be treated as reflecting – under 
certain circumstances – the nature of democracy. And this excessively violent variation of 
democracy needs to be taken into consideration if we are to better understand how democratic 
regimes may proceed in their dealing with terrorist threat, and why. This understanding may be 
required not only to help protect democracy from terrorism, but also protect democracy from its 
own violent counterterrorism reactions. 
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